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While the SARS-CoV-2 keeps spreading world-wide, comparing its evolution across different na-
tions is a timely challenge of both theoretical and practical importance. The large variety of dissim-
ilar and country-dependent epidemiological factors, in fact, makes extremely difficult to understand
their influence on the epidemic trends within a unique and coherent framework. We present a
geometric framework to characterize, in an integrated and low-dimensional fashion, the epidemic
plume-like trajectories traced by the infection rate, I, and the fatality rate, D, in the (I,D) plane.
Our analysis enables the definition of an epidemiometric system based on three geometric observ-
ables rating the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic events via scales analogous to those for the magnitude and
the intensity of seismic events. Being exquisitely geometric, our framework can be applied to classify
other epidemic data and secondary waves, raising the possibility of designing epidemic alerts or early
warning systems to enhance public and governmental responses to a rapidly emerging outbreak.
The unprecedented amount of epidemic data collected
worldwide on SARS-CoV-2 raises nowadays a unique op-
portunity to quantify, in a way analogous to other ex-
treme events [1, 2], the catastrophic impact that a pan-
demic can have on the globalized world [3, 4]. In the
context of earthquakes, for example, the existence of the
Richter [5] and Mercalli [6] measures, quantifying respec-
tively the magnitude and the intensity of a local seis-
mic event, has helped policy-makers to take informed
decisions yielding better intervention strategies (e.g. by
means of tsunami alerts or rapid post-earthquakes noti-
fications [7–10]) and strong governmental actions (e.g.
investments in anti-seismic infrastructures [11, 12]) to
prevent their potential impact. Similarly, in meteorol-
ogy, the Fujita [13] and the Saffir-Simpson [14, 15] scales
have offered researchers with heuristic measures to es-
timate the potential damage inflicted by, respectively,
tornados and hurricanes on human-build structures and
vegetation, raising the opportunity of designing ever-
increasingly refined early warning systems and alert pro-
tocols [16–18]. In the realm of pandemics, however, met-
ric systems enabling a comprehensive classification of
their types have (to the best of our knowledge) never
been proposed, resulting in a fundamental gap in the hu-
man fight against this type of catastrophic events.
The theoretical and practical implications of this im-
portant and timely challenge are numerous. Disposing
of a robust and comprehensive framework to classify
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic events reported across differ-
ent countries not only can enhance early [19, 20] public
and governmental responses in containing the spreading
and/or better absorbing the impact of a rapidly emerging
epidemic outbreak, but it can further provide new infor-
mation to better understand real-world epidemics and to
boost the forecasting power of existing models [21–29].
∗ ivan.bms.2011@gmail.com
A fundamental difficulty to achieve this goal relies in
the large heterogeneity of epidemiological and country-
dependent factors characterizing the global pandemic
trends. Diverse isolation [30] and social distancing strate-
gies [31–39], age, gender impact [40, 41] and demo-
graphic characteristics of different populations [42], lo-
cal transportation systems [43–47], tracking and testing
policies [48, 49], health systems’ capacities [50] and many
other factors, make difficult the design of quantitative
epidemiometric systems for country-to-country compari-
son [51–53]. Moreover, epidemic models or inference al-
gorithms fine-tuned to this constellation of features, in-
evitably result into theoretical or semi-empirical frame-
works whose complexity rapidly increases with the large
number of data-driven parameters considered [23, 54–61].
In this work, we present a geometric, low-dimensional
method to classify the impact the SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic events observed across different nations. After
performing a statistical best-fit of the epidemic data for
the infected, I, and deceased, D, rates, we analyze the
geometry of their plume-like trajectories in the (I,D)
plane. Moving to a polar representation, we classify the
plumes’ form through a set of three geometric parameters
yielding two complementary rating scales for the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic types: one according to their epidemic
magnitude—labeled with roman numbers from I to X
for increasing strengths—and measuring the “size” of a
national outbreak, and a second one according to their
intensity—labeled alphabetically fromA toD for increas-
ing speed—quantifying instead the damage inflicted on
the population. Even though each country exhibits its
own pandemic fingerprint, our geometric method unveils
hidden similarities shared by their global trends emerg-
ing from an integrated representation of their evolution.
We further provide a qualitative understanding of the
epidemiological information contained in the developed
epidemic measures, and discuss the theoretical and prac-
tical implications of our results.
1. Comparing the pandemic trends. To set the stage
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2for a cross-comparison of the countries’ pandemic trends,
let us consider two widely reported epidemiological ob-
servables, i.e. the infected (I) and the fatality (D) daily
rates. These quantities can vary strongly from one coun-
try to another, depending on a wide variety of factors.
Even within the same country, the numbers may fluctu-
ate from one day to another due to delays in reporting,
transitions to new surveillance and/or tasting systems, or
simply because of weekly periodic variations in the num-
ber of daily tests performed. Smoothening the data under
a suitable moving average window unveils the trends of
the time series, enabling a preliminary comparison.
As a demonstrative example, let us consider the pan-
demic trends reported in Italy and in Germany (Fig. 1).
In both countries, it took approximately 6 weeks for
the outbreaks to reach their infection peaks, with sim-
ilar fast-rising trends and comparable numbers of newly
infected patients per day. Their post-peak behaviors,
however, differ noticeably: whereas Germany’s infection
curve has decayed almost as quickly as it rose, resulting in
a reduction by 50% of the daily infected in nearly 15 days,
it has taken almost double this time to Italy to reach
similar conditions. This is nicely reflected in the values
of the skewnesses calculated after best-fitting the data
with asymmetric Gaussians (Fig. 1, legend), showing a
decay of the Italian trend roughly 2.3 times slower than
the one observed in Germany. Slow infection rate decays
similar to those reported in Italy have also been observed
in the United States, the United Kingdom or Russia and
can be explained as the result of new regional outbreaks
spreading throughout the country after the national lock-
down, hinting at a difficulty in identifying/containing the
virus since its early stages. Additional information can
be found by performing a similar analysis of the fatality
rates. This quickly reveals that Italy had to face much
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FIG. 1. Temporal evolution of epidemic profiles. (Color
online) Comparison between SARS-CoV-2 infected and fatal-
ity rate profiles for Italy (respectively, blue and dark blue
triangles) and Germany (respectively, orange and dark or-
ange circles) under a 15-days moving average. Infected and
deceased rates have been normalized with respect to the cor-
responding largest values reported in Italy. Different y scales
have been chosen for clarity of exposition. (Legend) Skew-
nesses values obtained after best fitting the global trends via
skewness Gaussian distributions. Data taken from Ref. [62].
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FIG. 2. Geometric parametrization of typical epi-
demic trends. (Color online) Demonstration of our geo-
metric method to analyze a typical epidemic trajectory in
the (I,D) plane; in this representation, time flows counter-
clockwise. Yellow and red arrows point respectively at the
infected and fatality rate peaks, while the markers evolve on
a daily rate. We calculate the largest radius, rmax ≡ AO, its
inclination, θ, and the largest width, r⊥ ≡ BC, of the plume-
like trajectory traced by the epidemic evolution. These quan-
tities define the triple (rmax, θ, ρ), with ρ ≡ r⊥/rmax, used to
analyze classify events as described in the text.
more critical conditions, counting (on average) at least
3 times more fatalities per day than Germany, with a
death peak located only 4 days after the infected one (by
contrast with the 2 weeks lag reported in Germany) and
a skewness roughly twice the one measured based on the
German data (Fig. 1, legend). By looking at these dif-
ferences separately, one can heuristically conclude that
both countries have experienced outbreaks with similar
magnitudes though causing very different damages on the
population, with Germany applying a more efficient pol-
icy of containment and/or testing and with Italy reaching
very critical level in its health system.
To extend the comparison to other countries, it proves
essential to identify a suitable metric system grasping
and systematically quantifying the relevant information
(e.g. peak values, infected-fatality peaks lags, post-peak
decay rates, etc.) enshrined in the evolution profiles of
the I and D trajectories. In the spirit of dynamical sys-
tems theory [63], we approach this problem by departing
from the representation of the dynamical observables I(t)
and D(t) as functions of time, focusing instead on their
mutual evolution in the (I,D) plane (Fig. 2). In this
way, a comprehensive portrait of the outbreak dynamics
of each country can be described by an integrated plume-
like trajectory (Fig. 2) whose geometric features, as we
shall see in what below, provide an exhaustive and low-
dimensional classification of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic
types according to their magnitude and intensity.
2. Geometric parametrization. In the (I,D) plane,
the daily epidemic state of each country traces a trajec-
tory that, after departing from the healthy phase (0, 0),
leaves behind its own epidemic fingerprint. For reasons
that will be clarified below, let us call “typical” an epi-
demic trajectory analogous to the one depicted in Fig. 2
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FIG. 3. (θ, ρ)-parametrization of typical SARS-CoV-2 pandemic trajectories. (Color online) a)–f) Epidemic trajec-
tories (dot-dashed curves) in the (I,D) plane obtained by interpolating the fitted epidemic states of each country describing
their first-wave events. These are generated via the distribution functions best fitting the infected and fatality rates (as in
Fig. 1) ruling the evolution of the real-world epidemic states (markers). The (θ, ρ) phase diagram summarizes the results of our
geometric analysis, where error bars are calculated by considering a confidence interval of 99% over values of θ and ρ for trajec-
tories fitting epidemic data under moving n-day averages with n from 1 to 15. A linear regression analysis yields ρ ' ρ0 + αθ,
with intercept ρ0 = (1.5±0.5)×10−2 and slope α = 0.40±0.06 (dashed gray line). The linear dependence of ρ on θ is supported
by a Pearson coefficient r˜ ' 0.81 [64]. Countries in the scatter plot are then selected according to shells (dashed circles) of
increasing radiuses, identifying six heuristic regimes, ranging from a) the ideal scenario of slow outbreaks with good tracking
intervention and low fatality rates, to f) extreme cases representing very fast outbreaks with high case-fatality rates and critical
conditions of their health systems. a)–f) Sampled trajectories belonging to each heuristic group exhibit epidemic angles (notice
the different extend of the y-axes) whose similarities can be better highlighted by normalizing the epidemic data of each group
via the largest rmax of the country in the collection. The normalization factors are respectively: a) rmax(IL) ' 5.2× 102, b)
rmax(GE) ' 5× 103, c) rmax(US) ' 3× 104, d) rmax(SP ) ' 7× 103, e) rmax(UK) ' 5.3× 103, f) rmax(FR) ∼ 4.2× 103.
and characterized by a dynamics that unfolds counter-
clockwise in the plane, reaching first the infected peak,
then the fatality peak, and finally heads back towards the
axes origin. Notice that during this heading back regime,
new outbreaks could emerge due to e.g. premature lifting
of the lockdown measures, pushing the epidemic state to
trace a different plume-like trajectory (Fig. 9a) describ-
ing a new epidemic event. Here, we focus our analysis on
the epidemic data reported during the first-wave events
in countries that have passed both their infected and fa-
tality rate peaks. In the discussion section we will see
how our geometric method can be naturally extended to
analyze second-wave events like those observed in United
States, Iran or Israel (see Fig. 9b).
To quantitatively compare the countries’ typical epi-
demic trajectories, we introduce three geometric parame-
ters, (rmax, θ, ρ), that we measure after transforming the
epidemic observables I, D into polar coordinates. We
define with rmax the maximal radius of the epidemic tra-
jectory, with θ the angle formed by rmax with respect
to the I-axes, and finally with ρ = r⊥/rmax the rela-
tive width of the plume-like curve, where r⊥ is its max-
imal width (Fig. 2). While rmax measures the largest
extent of the epidemic plume—and has therefore units
of population—the quantities θ and ρ have a genuine ge-
ometric nature and disclose different information about
the intensity of an epidemic event. Large values of θ, in
fact, reflect a fast raise of the number of fatalities jointly
with a rapid increase of the newly infected, which would
occur in cases of a critical health system but also reflect
the country’s demographic features, like age and morbid-
ity distributions, social interactions, etc. In this respect,
4we adopt θ as an estimator of the epidemic “speed”,
with large (small) angles describing fast (slow) outbreaks.
The parameter ρ, on the other hand, can be written in
terms of the “eccentricity”, e, of the epidemic trajec-
tory as ρ =
√
1− e2 [65], so that decreasing values of
ρ characterize narrower plumes. This would naturally
reflect situations of rapid patient identification, result-
ing in lower critical conditions of the country’s hospitals
and hence to less fatalities, i.e. lower values of the angle
θ. The results in Fig. 3 support this heuristic interpre-
tation, disclosing a linear relation between the two ge-
ometric observables θ and ρ. In light of the latter, we
have selected countries according to their Euclidean dis-
tance from the origin of the (θ, ρ) scatter plot, yielding
a preliminary partitioning of their outbreaks according
to their speed, as shown in Fig. 3 a)–f). Besides high-
lighting similar inclination of the epidemic trajectories,
the normalization by rmax adopted in Fig. 3 a)–f) fur-
ther discloses an additional degree of similarity between
countries based on the time lag separating infected and
fatality rate peaks. Countries with low angles like e.g.
Germany, Austria or Norway (Fig. 3b) feature, in fact,
round plumes with well separated peaks as well as more
narrow forms like those reported in e.g. Israel (Fig. 3a),
Greece or Finland (Fig. 3c). On the contrary, countries
with large epidemic angles always correspond to narrow
plumes with strong peak-to-peak proximity, as observed
e.g. in Italy (Fig. 3d), Hungary (Fig. 3e) or Belgium
(Fig. 3f). As we shall see in the next section, the eccen-
tricity of the normalized epidemic plumes nicely grasps
this important information, enabling to define a simple
yet informative metric system characterizing the inten-
sity of the SARS-CoV-2 types.
Before delving into the details of this classification, let
us complete the picture by considering those epidemic
plumes which have not been included in the analysis due
to their non-typical evolution in the (I,D) plane. This
includes epidemic data describing first-wave events whose
fatality rate peak has preceded the infected one, as ob-
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FIG. 4. Non-typical SARS-CoV-2 trajectories. (Color
online) Epidemic trajectories featuring clockwise evolution,
due to a fatality peak preceding the infected one, as reported
in Morocco, United Arab Emirates (ARE), Iran, Dominican
Republic and other countries. Here, rmax(ARE) ' 3.2× 102.
served e.g. in Brazil, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Iran
(Fig. 4) and few others. Such peak inversion translates
into a clockwise evolution of the epidemic trajectory in
the (I,D) plane, whose geometric features could, in prin-
ciple, be analyzed according to our developed method but
should not be similarly interpreted. Fatality-rate peaks
preceding the infected ones can be, in fact, only explained
as the result of sparse and incomplete reporting due to
e.g. limited resources at early stages of diagnostics or ab-
sence of post-mortem identification. For the sake of sim-
plicity, in what follows we will focus only on the analysis
of typical epidemic trajectories, while the classification of
non-typical cases will be performed elsewhere.
3. Classification of SARS-CoV-2 types. Having intro-
duced a geometric parametrization of the countries typ-
ical epidemic trajectories, let us now focus on defining
a suitable and conventional metric system to systemati-
cally quantify their magnitude and intensity.
Outbreak magnitude. As we anticipated, the parame-
ter rmax yields an integrated measure in the (I,D) plane
of the largest extent of an epidemic trajectory in units of
population, offering the opportunity to analyze the de-
pendence of the epidemic extent on the population size,
P , of the country where it spread. By plotting the dis-
tribution of rmax as a function of P (Fig. 5), we find an
approximate power law rmax = AP β , with A ∈ (0, 1) a
country-dependent proportionality factor and β an expo-
nent close to one. The nearly linear relation can be ex-
plained by interpreting A as the largest fraction of daily
infected and deceased reported for a given population
size, suggesting a rudimentary yet informative scale to
meaningfully quantify the epidemic magnitude of each
country. To this aim, let us introduce the dimensionless
parameter x = log rmax/ logP . Because rmax and P are
linearly proportional, this relation reads as
x = 1 + logA/ logP, (1)
where P > 1, so that x ∈ (−∞, 1) is a monotonically in-
creasing function of the proportionality factor A ∈ (0, 1).
This fraction is bounded by two extreme cases: A → 0
describing an extremely weak (nearly absent) outbreak
with only few infected/deceased daily cases, and A → 1
representing instead the unlikely event of a nearly full
population infected/deceased in a single day. Similar to
the Richter metric system for local seismic events, an epi-
demic magnitude scale can be conventionally defined by
choosing a suitable, monotonically increasing function of
x in Eq. (1), where x can be interpreted as the “epidemic
force” of an outbreak, measuring the largest fraction of
new infected and deceased reported in a single day. Let
us therefore define the epidemic magnitude as
T (x ) = 10x/x
∗
, (2)
where x ∗ ≡ 1 − 3/ logP plays the role of a characteris-
tic epidemic strength. The choice of x ∗ allows to assign
the scale T = 10 to a pandemic event with nearly 0.1%
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FIG. 5. Extent/population correlation in SARS-CoV-
2 trajectories. (Color online) Distribution of rmax vs. pop-
ulation size, P , for the countries listed in Fig. 3. A linear fit
(p-value ∼ 10−6) yields log(rmax) = r0 +β log(P ), with inter-
cept r0 = −4.1± 1.5 and slope β = 0.95± 0.20 (dashed gray
line). The statistical significance of the linear relation is fur-
ther supported by a Pearson correlation coefficient r˜ ∼ 0.71.
Data points are are colored from blue to red for increasing val-
ues of the epidemic magnitude T (see Tab. I). Dashed green
and red lines respectively describe the boundary of the ++
and −− categories, rating the efficacy of each country inter-
vention strategies (we refer to the main text for details).
of the population reported infected and/or deceased in a
single day (i.e. A∗ = 10−3), an outcome of catastrophic
proportions. In light of Eqs. (1)–(2), we introduce an
epidemiometric system classifying epidemic events by in-
creasing magnitudes that is described as follows:
I) T ∈ [0.0, 0.9], micro events: very weak outbreaks
having strengths x < 0 or, equivalently, rmax < 1,
i.e. an average of less than 1 infected case per day;
II) T ∈ [1.0, 1.9], minor events: weak outbreaks with
non-negative strengths corresponding to values of
rmax ∈ [1, 4) for small countries with P ∼ 105, and
rmax ∈ [1, 32) for large countries with P ∼ 108;
III) T ∈ [2.0, 2.9], light events: epidemics featuring e.g.
values of rmax ∈ [4, 9) if P ∼ 105, and rmax ∈
[32, 250) for large countries with P ∼ 108;
IV) T ∈ [3.0, 3.9], mild events: outbreaks character-
ized by e.g. rmax ∈ [9, 16) if P ∼ 105, and rmax ∈
[250, 103) if P ∼ 108;
V) T ∈ [4.0, 4.9], moderate events: epidemics with e.g.
rmax ∈ [16, 25) for P ∼ 105, and rmax ∈ [103, 3 ×
3.1× 103) for P ∼ 108;
VI) T ∈ [5.0, 5.9], strong events: epidemics with e.g.
rmax ∈ [25, 36) for P ∼ 105 (i.e. averaged daily
percentage of infected/deceased reaching peaks be-
tween 0.025% to 0.036% of the total population),
and rmax ∈ [3.1×103, 7.8×103] for P ∼ 108 (peaks
between 0.003% and 0.008% of P per day);
VII) T ∈ [6.0, 6.9], very strong events: epidemics charac-
terized by values of rmax ∈ [36, 49) for small coun-
tries with P ∼ 105, and rmax ∈ [7.8×103, 1.7×104)
for large countries with P ∼ 108;
VIII) T ∈ [7.0, 7.9], violent events: outbreaks featuring
e.g. values of rmax ∈ [49, 64) for P ∼ 105, and
rmax ∈ [1.7× 104, 3.3× 104] for P ∼ 108;
IX) T ≥ 8.0, extreme epidemic events featuring e.g. val-
ues of rmax ≥ 64 for P ∼ 105, and rmax > 3.3×104
for P ∼ 108, i.e. outbreaks whose daily percentages
of infected/deceased reach peaks respectively larger
than 0.06% and 0.03% of the total population.
Similarly to the Richter scale for seismic events, our
epidemic magnitude scale T characterizes the local (since
it depends on the population size) strength of an epi-
demic in an exponential fashion, so that each jump by
class identifies a tenfold increase in daily reported in-
fected/deceased among countries with similar population
sizes. When applied to the available data of the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic, T yields the repartition of the epidemic
events summarized in Tab. I, with respect to which we
filled the data points in Fig. 5 with colors ranging from
dark blue to dark red for increasing magnitudes. A pri-
mary observation is that all the countries of our dataset
have experienced epidemic events of magnitude equal or
larger than III [66], reflecting the severe and broad im-
pact that the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has had worldwide.
We notice also that the different responses that countries
with similar population sizes (e.g., P ∼ 107) have had to
the pandemic spread is nicely captured by T , with e.g.
country T d type
GRC 2.9 0.7 III++
HU 3.0 0.6 IV++
MYS 3.1 0.8 IV++
JP 3.4 0.9 IV++
AUS 3.7 0.5 IV++
FIN 3.7 0.2 IV+
KOR 3.7 0.6 IV++
CHN 3.8 1.1 IV+++
CZE 3.9 0.2 IV+
ROU 3.9 0.3 IV+
NO 4.3 -0.1 V−
IL 4.9 -0.2 V−
AT 5.1 -0.26 VI−
country T d type
CA 5.1 -0.1 VI−
NL 5.2 -0.25 VI−
PT 5.2 -0.29 VI−
TU 5.4 -0.17 VI−
FR 5.6 -0.26 VI−
GE 5.7 -0.25 VI−
CH 5.8 -0.49 VI−
UK 5.9 -0.35 VI−
BE 6.0 -0.52 VII−−
IE 6.0 -0.58 VII−−
IT 6.0 -0.39 VII−
US 6.5 -0.45 VII−
SP 6.6 -0.62 VII−−
TABLE I. Magnitude of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. Clas-
sification of the SARS-CoV-2 first-wave epidemic events ac-
cording to their magnitude, T = 10x/x
∗
, where x ∗ ≡ 1 −
3/ logP represents an upper limit to the epidemic “strength”
characterizing an outbreak of catastrophic proportions (see
Eq. (2) and discussions therein). Nations’ intervention ef-
ficiency, rated with plus and minus signs, is measured ac-
cording to the deviation of all countries best linear fit d =
r0 + log(P
β/rdatmax) from the ordinate r
dat
max of each data point
(see the main text for more details).
6cases like Greece or Hungary both experiencing light out-
breaks, and cases like Israel or Switzerland facing instead
moderate to strong events (see Tab. I). Very strong pan-
demic events can be instead recognized by the orange col-
ors in countries like Italy, France or Germany, and even
more extreme ones by increasingly red colors describing
the cases of the United States (magnitude 6.5) and Spain
(magnitude 6.6). Surprisingly, we find that the first-wave
epidemic event in Spain features in fact a larger magni-
tude than the one reported in the United States.
The linear regression analysis in Fig. 5 provides with
additional information the classification by magnitude of
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic types. Unlike other catas-
trophic events, in fact, epidemic outbreaks can be influ-
enced at their early stages by social intervention strate-
gies [30–39], and so do their magnitude scales. While
T measures the impact of the pandemic across differ-
ent countries, the deviation of all countries best linear
fit d = log(rmax/r
dat
max) from the ordinate r
dat
max of each
data point can be adopted to rate the effectiveness of the
intervention strategies adopted. Values of d for the avail-
able data and reported in Tab. I, are typically dispersed
in the unit interval (dashed green and red lines in Fig. 5)
around zero, suggesting the following rating system for
the social intervention strategies adopted: +++) for
d ≥ 1 as reported in countries that, despite their pop-
ulation size, managed to contain the outbreak very effi-
ciently; ++) if 0.5 ≤ d ≤ 0.9 and +) if 0 ≤ d < 0.5
for countries with efficient to good intervention; −) if
−0.5 ≤ d < 0 and −−) if −1 ≤ d < −0.5 describing
instead weak or not prompt responses to the emergent
outbreaks. We find (see Fig. 5) that highly populated
countries like China or Japan applied successful social
intervention protocols which kept low the magnitude of
the epidemic events, while other countries like Ireland,
Belgium or Spain gained less efficient results, experienc-
ing outbreaks of larger magnitudes.
Outbreak intensity. In the previous section we adopted
the epidemic angle θ (defined by the inclination of rmax
with respect to the I-axes) as an estimator of the “speed”
of an epidemic event, with large values of θ reflecting
highly critical conditions of the country’s health system.
We have also shown that θ is linearly correlated (Fig. 3)
to the geometric parameter ρ, measuring instead the rel-
ative width of the epidemic plumes, whose values can be
adopted to evaluate the quality of a country’s strategies
for contact tracing or patient identification. The normal-
ization of the trajectories by rmax shown in Fig. 3a)–f),
has highlighted that a further informative quantification
of the country’s tracking strategies can be obtained by
considering the “eccentricity”, e =
√
1− ρ2, of the nor-
malized epidemic plumes. On the one hand, this oper-
ation removes all the information about the relative ex-
tend of the infected and fatality rates and hence it wipes
out the classification of the epidemic events according to
the angle θ. On the other hand, analyzing the eccen-
tricity of the normalized epidemic plumes yields a more
faithful comparison among their forms, clearly isolating
θ
e
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FIG. 6. Intensity scales of typical SARS-CoV-2 epi-
demic trajectories. (Color online) Hybrid scatter plot de-
scribing the distribution of typical epidemic events according
to their angle θ (raw data) expressed in radians, and eccentric-
ity e (normalized data). Epidemic events with angles larger
than the threshold θ∗ = 0.05 (red dashed line) can be taken
to describe fast pandemic with increasing speed (categories
B, C, D). These categories appear to correspond to epidemic
plumes with large eccentricities (class 55) and small peak-
to-peak separation, reflecting late identification of infected
patients or selection of diagnostic testing only for critically
ill cases. Slow pandemics (i.e. category A), on another hand,
disclose a broader spectrum of forms (classes 55,5, 4,44)
reflecting different strategies of patient identification.
narrow plumes from rounder ones. To make the best out
of this trade-off of information, we have created the hy-
brid scatter-plot (θ, e) shown in Fig. 6, where countries’
SARS-CoV-2 events are classified according to the angle
of their row epidemic data (just as in Fig. 3) and the
eccentricity of their normalized plumes. When applied
to the available data, this hybrid representation unveils
something surprising. We find, in fact, that epidemic an-
gles larger than a threshold value θ∗ ≡ 0.05 always cor-
respond to narrow plumes with normalized eccentricities
e ∈ (0.9, 1). Instead, plumes with θ < θ∗ can correspond
to a broader spectrum of forms, from the round ones re-
ported in Japan, Austria or Germany, to more narrow
types like those of Canada, Portugal or Turkey.
To explain this surprising pattern, let us notice that
the main factor decreasing the eccentricity of a normal-
ized epidemic plume is an increasing time lag between
the infected and fatality rate peaks which, in its turn,
suggests that the data of reported infected and deceased
are less likely correlated. The eccentricity can then be
adopted for comparing the countries’ strategies for pa-
tient identification, with small values of e characterizing
efficient tracking protocols, and large values of e describ-
ing instead situations where the majority of the fatalities
were infected patients tested positive only after arriving
at the hospitals in critical conditions. This is probably
best represented in Fig. 6 by cases like the United King-
dom (e ' 0.990), Italy (e ' 0.987) or the Netherlands
(e ' 0.985) which all experienced violent outbreaks with
identification only of critically ill patients [67] and highly
critical conditions (θ > θ∗) of their medical system [68].
Fig. 6 suggests therefore the following data-driven clas-
7sification by intensity, i.e. based on the damage produced
on the population, of the SARS-CoV-2 events:
A) θ < θ∗, slow pandemics: low values (1.4% in Aus-
tralia to 6.1% in Greece [62]) of the largest case-
fatality rate, well functioning health system;
B) θ∗ ≤ θ < 0.1, moderately-fast pandemics: higher
(6.8% in Ireland to 12.2% in Spain) case-fatality
rates, mild disruption of the medical system;
C) 0.1 ≤ θ < 0.15, fast pandemics: severe disruption
of the health system, possibility of strategic triage,
high (12% in the Netherlands to 14.1% in Hungary)
largest case-fatality rate;
D) θ ≥ 0.15, very fast pandemics: very high (15.9%
in the United Kingdom to 19% in France) largest
case-fatality rate, medical crisis, strategic triage.
Similarly to the magnitude, T , the epidemic intensity
scale can be accompanied by a rating system quantify-
ing in this case the efficiency of patient identification
and contact tracing strategies, suitably defined as fol-
lows: 44) plumes with eccentricity e ≤ 0.7, featured
by countries that performed extensive testing and rapid
patient identification, resulting in less correlated data se-
ries for infected and deceased rates as reflected by large
peak-to-peak time lags; 4) plumes with eccentricities
0.7 < e ≤ 0.8, describing good patient identification;
5) plumes with eccentricity 0.8 < e ≤ 0.9, describing
mildly efficient patient identification; 55) plumes having
eccentricity e ≥ 0.9 and strong peak-to-peak proximity,
reflecting weak or not-efficient identification strategies.
This classification reflects, in a quantitative fashion, a
simple yet essential fact regarding the fight against the
SARS-CoV-2 virus: rapid patient identification leads to
functional health system and low case-fatality rates (cat-
egory A44), whereas less and less efficient strategies lead
more often to fast pandemics (categories B–D) depend-
ing on the country’s hospital capacities.
4. Temporal evolution of the epidemic angle. The in-
troduction of the epidemic magnitude (Fig. 5 and Tab. I)
and intensity (Fig. (6)) enabled a preliminary yet in-
formative classification of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic
events, highlighting the main ingredients underlying their
epidemiometric fingerprints. An important byproduct of
this result lies in the possibility of designing alarm pro-
tocols and other precautionary measures to dampen the
societal effects of a pandemic event [1, 2]. In fact, un-
derstanding the magnitude and intensity of the SARS-
CoV-2 epidemic events could help policy-makers to make
informative decisions not only for investing resources to
strengthen a country’ health system, but it can enhance
the public awareness with the design of alarms platforms
aiming at facilitating contact tracing or promoting re-
sponsible actions of social-distancing.
Unlike other catastrophic events, in fact, the magni-
tude and intensity of a pandemic lie entirely in the hands
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FIG. 7. Evolution of the epidemic angle. (Color on-
line) Temporal evolution of the epidemic angle for different
countries’ plumes, obtained by best fitting the data series
(smoothened by a 15-day moving average) with a daily update
of their epidemic state. Countries experiencing fast epidemic
events of category C−− or higher cross the threshold angle
θ∗ (red dashed line) way before reaching their infected peaks
(red filled markers) and fatality peaks (black filled markers).
Slow epidemics, like in Germany, keep instead their epidemic
angle below θ∗ already when reaching the infected peak.
of the countries’ governments, their preparedness to ab-
sorb the impact of a rapidly emerging outbreak, and the
awareness of societies to its potential damage. In this
light, quick actions at the early stages of an epidemic
outbreak in tracking the infected [48] or more efficient
social intervention protocols [36, 38] can help curbing
down dramatically [30, 69] its devastating effects. This
is why an early estimation of the outbreak scales could
significantly help designing epidemic alerts for enhancing
the public and governmental awareness and help fighting
against the virus spreading. In this context, understand-
ing how the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic scales evolve in time
could provide significant information for future design of
early warning systems [20] and risk alerts [19].
Motivated by this idea, we have analyzed in Fig. 7
the temporal evolution of the epidemic angle θ for a
few representative countries of Fig. 6. The results in
Fig. 7 show that countries having experienced fast pan-
demics of category C55 or higher such as Italy, Spain
or Belgium, all crossed the critical angle θ∗ long before
reaching their infected peaks (red filled circles), reflect-
ing a slow responsiveness [70] to the rapidly emerging
outbreak. On the contrary, countries like Germany (or
Austria and Switzerland, not shown in Fig. 7 to simplify
the exposition) succeeded in keeping θ below θ∗ already
when they reached their infected rate peaks, suggesting
efficient patient identification and well functioning med-
ical systems. Advanced knowledge of the epidemic in-
tensity could have helped countries like Italy or Spain in
adjusting more rapidly their policies of contact tracing
and identification of seriously ill patients, offering more
options of intervention to fight the epidemic crisis.
5. Low-dimensional parametrization. Our geomet-
ric analysis additionally hints at an integrated, low-
dimensional parametrization for modeling the evolution
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FIG. 8. SEIRD trajectories and low-dimensional parametrization. (Color online) a) Representation in the (I,D)
plane of typical (Fig. ??) epidemic trajectories obtained by solving Eqs. 3 with fixed parameters (γ, σ, µ,R0,i, R0,f , κ, τ) =
(1/3, 1/5, 1/3, 8, 0, 0, 0) and decreasing fatality rates α = (1/5, 1/10, 1/20) (presented as percentages in the legend). This choice
of parameters describes an epidemic similar to SARS-CoV-2 but with constant reproduction rate R0 = 4, where individuals
incubate the virus for an average period of 5 days, gets infected at rate β ' 1.33, and recover/die in an average period of 3
days. b) Demonstration of the SEIRD trajectory obtained by manual searching for epidemiological parameters matching the
data-driven geometric constraints. For the Italian outbreak (open markers), this low-dimensional analysis leads to an SEIRD
trajectory (blue curve) characterized by the parameters (γ, σ, α, µ,R0,i, R0,f , κ, τ) = (1/3, 1/5, 1/7, 1/2.95, 3.89, 0.98, 0.24, 44)
whose features are qualitatively similar to those characterizing the best-fitting pseudo-ellipses (orange curve).
of real-world epidemic trajectories. In fact, the geometric
parametrization of the epidemic plumes allows (at least,
on the coarse-grained level of the national trends) to cur-
tail with a few parameters the essential information rul-
ing the epidemic spreading [28, 51], out of a variety of
epidemiological factors, from e.g. different gender-based
transmission factors [71–73], to mobility patterns [74, 75]
and social mixing [38, 76], to cities’ pollution [19], differ-
ent quarantine [77] or testing strategies [78] and many
others. Even when adopting a well-mixed approxima-
tion among different compartments, developing a predic-
tive framework embracing such a variety of factors eas-
ily results into mathematical or computational tour de
forces [27, 55, 56] whose complexity quickly grows with
the number of realistic features included.
From another viewpoint, modern epidemic models
based either on detailed descriptions of the population’s
compartments [30, 56, 79] or merging simplified versions
of the latter with tools of bayesian inference [27] and neu-
ral networks [80], typically yield predictions of a coun-
try’s epidemic trend after fitting either its data for the
infected rates or the ones fo the fatality rates. This
separated approach leads to best-fitting epidemiological
factors that, when adopted to describe the behaviors of
other compartments which have not been fitted to the
data, lead to results far from the real-world trends.
Our geometric approach offers a viable solution to cir-
cumvent both these limitations by best-fitting the syn-
thetic epidemic plumes directly to the data-driven ones,
enabling in this way an integrated and low-dimensional
estimation of the epidemiological parameters best de-
scribing the outbreak evolution.
As a demonstrative example, let us consider an SEIRD
epidemic model [81, 82] to describe the SARS-CoV-2 dy-
namics. For completeness, let us recall that the SEIRD
model suitably characterizes the spreading of a viral
agent featuring a latent (sometimes also referred to as
cryptic [83]) phase where susceptible individuals (S) be-
come exposed (E), i.e. they acquire the infection but are
not yet infectious. After a characteristic incubation pe-
riod 1/σ days (with σ ∈ (0, 1]), exposed individuals be-
come infectious (I) and start spreading the disease at a
speed, λ, controlling the average number of people an in-
fected person infects per day. Infected individuals spread
the disease during an average period of 1/γ days (with
γ ∈ (0, 1]), after which they either recover (R) or die (D).
Let 1/µ (with µ ∈ (0, 1]) be the characteristic period of
days during which an infected individual becomes criti-
cally ill and eventually dies, and α ∈ [0, 1] the fatality
rate characterizing instead the probability of going from
infected to death (i.e., α), and from infected to recovered
(i.e., 1 − α). The parameters λ, σ, γ, µ, α define respec-
tively the infectious, incubation, recovery, mortality and
fatality rates of the SEIRD model; to simplify the anal-
ysis, let us assume that once recovered, individuals gain
immunity. The above epidemic process is summarized in
the system of differential equations:
S′ = −λsI, E′ = λsI − σE
I ′ = σE − (1− α)γI − αµI,
R′ = (1− α)γI, D′ = αµI,
(3)
where s ≡ S/N is the density of susceptible individuals
and N the population size. As a last ingredient, let us
include in Eq. 3 the additional information of a time de-
pendent infectious rate λ(t), identifying the introduction
of social distancing measures and quarantine strategies.
These, in fact, aim at lowering the basic reproduction
number R0 = λ/γ of the virus from a certain initial
9value R0,i > 1 to a final one R0,f < 1. To model this
decay, whose speed will depend on the efficiency of the
lockdown strategy applied by a country, let us adopt a
logistic function of the form
R0(t) =
R0,i −R0,f
1 + eκ(t−τ)
+R0,f , (4)
where τ, κ ≥ 0 are two “intervention” parameters ruling
respectively the time of the inflection point in the profile
of R0(t) (i.e. the day of the country’s main lockdown) and
the decay rate of the reproduction number as a result of
the lockdown efficacy. In particular, values of κ ∼ O(1)
result into a fast decay of R0(t) (signaling a rapid and
efficient intervention), while κ ∼ 10−1 or smaller results
into a very slow convergence towards R0,f .
Already at this simplistic level, the epidemiological
(λ, σ, γ, µ, α,R0,i, R0,f ) and intervention (τ, κ) param-
eters aiming at representing the data-driven epidemic
plumes, identify an 8-dimensional phase space for the
dynamical system in Eq. (3). Thanks to our geomet-
ric parametrization, it proves possible to find the func-
tional dependences relating this variety of parameters to
the three geometric factors (rmax, θ, e), whose relations
identify a series of data-driven parametric constraints to
reduce the degrees of freedom of the problem. Finding
the exact dependence between the epidemiological vari-
ables and the geometric factors is beyond the scope of
the present work and will be discussed elsewhere. Nev-
ertheless, it is immediate to verify that e.g. an increase
of the case-fatality rate α leads to an increase of the epi-
demic angle (Fig. 8a)—i.e. larger epidemic intensities—
while increasing the infection rate λ yields larger values of
rmax—i.e. larger epidemic magnitudes—supporting our
heuristic arguments in Sec. 3.
Fig. 8b demonstrates this integrated, low-dimensional
approach applied to the Italian epidemic data. We have
performed a manual search of the epidemiological param-
eters best fitting the data-driven values θIT ' 0.137 and
ρIT ' 0.44, selecting a suitable sub-manifold of the phase
space featuring trajectories geometrically congruent to
the data-driven one. Even if they do not best-fit the
data-driven plumes (empty markers and blue curve in
Fig. 8b), the set of parameters we identified generates a
SEIRD plume nicely matching the epidemic data. In par-
ticular, we find that a relatively large initial reproduction
number RIT0,i ' 3.9 (in qualitative agreement to the more
precise ones obtained by best fitting regional data [84])
and a low lockdown efficiency parameter κIT ' 0.24, re-
flecting the slow decay already observed in Fig. (1) and
therein quantified by a high infected rate skewness. The
low-dimensional analysis further discloses another realis-
tic ingredient characterizing the Italian pandemic type,
i.e. the high case-fatality rate σIT ' 14.2% reflecting the
strong intensity of the Italian outbreak and the critical
conditions reached by its health care system. Further de-
veloping these geometric-based concepts could lead to the
identification of additional parametric constraints further
reducing the degrees of freedom of epidemic models, pos-
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FIG. 9. Second-wave analysis. a) Synthetic data (gray cir-
cles) generated by considering for both the infected and the
fatality rates bimodal skewed Gaussians with well resolved
first- and second-wave peaks. The two trajectories, describ-
ing respectively the first (blue dot-dashed curve) and second
(red dot-dashed curve) waves, are analyzed by separating the
corresponding fitting plumes. Both the epidemic events have
same magnitude but different epidemic angles, with the first
wave of category B and the second one of category A. b) Epi-
demic data describing the evolution of the outbreak in Israel
(darker cyan circles) and its fitted double-plume trajectory
(gray dashed curve). By separating each fitting curve as in a)
we identify the first epidemic wave (blue, dot-dashed curve)
of magnitude T1 ' 4.9 and category A−, and the ongoing
second wave (red, dot-dashed curve). As of July 20 2020, the
second-wave event in Israel has epidemic angle θIL ' 0.005
(i.e. category A), and magnitude T2 ' 6.6 (i.e. class VII).
sibly boosting their forecasting power. Considering ad-
ditional information coming e.g. from the different curvi-
linear velocities of the right and left lobes of the epidemic
plumes, the local curvature of their traces may yield un-
familiar perspectives in achieving this task.
6. Future directions. Our study is only a preliminary
step in the design of metric systems for epidemic events.
We expect that the results will inspire the development
of more refined epidemiometric frameworks for rating the
magnitude and the impact of present and future epi-
demics, helping governments and other decision-makers
to strengthen their policies of containment and better
respond to such extreme events. In this perspective, we
highlight in what follows a few important directions of
future research in which respect we believe that our geo-
metric approach could be further developed.
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FIG. 10. SARS-CoV-2 epidemic surfaces. Evolution in the (I,D,R) space of the data (markers) describing the epidemic
state for a selection of countries: a) Italy, b) Germany, c) United states and d) Austria. Data have been selected to identify
the first-wave event for each country, where a second one was observed. Each trajectory traces a surface (shadowed areas)
whose projections on the (I,D), (I,R) and (R,D) planes are further shown. While Italy’s surface unfolds in the space almost
perpendicular to the (I,D) plane (where it traces the narrow trajectory discussed in Fig. 8b), Germany’s surface unfolds
nearly parallel to the (I,D) plane, tracing instead a rounder pseudo-ellipses (i.e. larger normalized eccentricity). Behaviors
respectively similar to a) Italy and b) Germany are observed in c) the United States, as well as in Spain or France (with the
last two not shown in the above to ease the exposition) and in d) Austria, as well as Switzerland or Australia (not shown).
i) Beyond first-waves. Our analysis focused on typi-
cal (i.e. counter-clockwise evolving) epidemic trajectories
describing the first-wave events of the SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic in a selection of countries. As of July 20 2020, some
nations included in our analysis have entered secondary
epidemic waves whose magnitude appears already to be
larger than the classification in Tab. I; this is the case of
e.g. the United States, Iran, Israel or Serbia. Extending
the geometric method to secondary waves is possible as
long as the first and the second-wave peaks of the in-
fected and deceased rates are sufficiently resolved over
time (Fig. 9a). In this case, fitting the data by multi-
ple (skewed) Gaussians allows to trace a new epidemic
trajectory in the (I,D) plane whose evolution may cross
itself and disclose geometric features significantly differ-
ent from those of the first wave. By isolating the fitting
functions describing each lobe (Fig. 9a), it is possible to
perform an analysis perfectly analogous to the one de-
scribed above for the case of first-waves, identifying the
epidemic angle θ, largest extend rmax and eccentricity e
of the second-wave trajectory. As most of the nations
that entered the second wave have not yet reached their
new infected peak, we cannot yet draw conclusive eval-
uation about the magnitude and intensity of their new
epidemic events, but we track the evolution of the geo-
metric parameters characterizing their new trajectories
as suggested in Sec. 5 (see Fig. 7). In Fig. 9b we have
presented the epidemic trajectories describing the state
of Israel. A preliminary evaluation shows that while the
new wave has already a magnitude T2 ' 6.6, i.e. a very
strong epidemic event comparable to the first-wave event
of Spain or US (see Sec. 3), its epidemic angle is still rel-
atively low (θIL < 0.005) with respect to the threshold
value θ∗ = 0.05 of the onset of a fast pandemic (Fig. 6).
Comparing the magnitude and intensity of different epi-
demic events in the same country could help understand-
ing how different countries prepared themselves to absorb
and dampen the impact of a new wave of epidemic events.
ii) Including daily testing data. An important direction
of future research for improving the epidemic measures
defined in the above concerns the inclusion of the infor-
mation related to the number of daily testing performed
by each country. Depending on their resources, in fact,
different countries applied different strategies of testing
or contact tracing in their fight [85] against the spread
of SARS-CoV-2. Germany or Russia, for example, have
been performing a tremendous amount of tests since the
early stages of the pandemics and over a very broad [86]
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fraction of the population, including both symptomatic
and asymptomatic patients. Countries like Italy [67] or
Spain [87] had instead to prioritize their diagnostic capac-
ities to test patients with more severe clinical symptoms
and in need of hospitalization. Including this relevant bit
of information in the analysis above, e.g. by normalizing
the number of new daily infected by the corresponding
number of daily new tests, would possibly result into an
even more meaningful comparison of the countries epi-
demic magnitude than the one in Tab. I and, likewise, of
the classification by intensity depicted in Fig. 6.
iii) Zooming-in: local characterization of countries
pandemic types. Our results have focused on analyzing
the epidemic trends reported at national levels, offering
a country-to-country comparison of their SARS-CoV-2
pandemic types. The epidemiometric system of epidemic
events proposed however, can be equivalently adopted
to analyze more local datasets of each country, offering
a magnifying lens to determine the magnitude and the
intensity of the epidemic events observed within states,
regions or even on the smaller scales of provinces and
towns. In the case of Italy, for example, regions such as
Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Piemonte and Veneto have
suffered more severe epidemic events than the rest of the
country [19], and a similar situation has been reported
in United States for the states of New York, California
and (more recently) of Florida [88]. An efficient inter-
vention at the national level could find its crucial ingre-
dients in a rapid intervention on the level of its states,
regions or provinces. Combined with forecasting tools
and prior epidemic risk assessments, our epidemiomet-
ric framework could provide the design of local epidemic
alerts to enhance the awareness of governments and in-
habitants already at local levels, helping to counter the
spreading of highly infectious viruses like SARS-CoV-2.
iv) Geometry of the epidemic surfaces. As a conclu-
sive remark, let us notice that in our developed geomet-
ric analysis, we have focused only on the projections of
the epidemic trajectories in the (I,D) plane. However,
other compartments (e.g. recovered, critical patients, ac-
tive cases, etc) can be included in the analysis, result-
ing in a multi-dimensional representation of the epidemic
state of each country. For instance, the addition of the
compartment of daily recovered (R) yields the emergence
of new information to further refine the classification of
the pandemic fingerprints reported in different nations.
Fig. 10) contains a few examples of “epidemic surfaces”
in the (I,D,R) 3D-space observed in a selection of coun-
tries. In particular, the cases of Italy (Fig. 10a) and
Germany (Fig. 10b) clearly exhibit striking differences
in their dynamic evolution: Italy’s epidemic surface fea-
tures a narrow cross-section in its projection on the (I,D)
plane and a broad trajectory in the (R,D) plane, as op-
posed to the epidemic surface characterizing Germany’s
outbreak. The two surfaces, in fact, appear to be roughly
orthogonal with each other, a clear indication that in
Italy the increase of infected yielded a rapid and simul-
taneous increase of deceased. Similar behaviors can be
found in cases belonging to the same magnitude and in-
tensity. For example, Austria (Fig. 10d) as well as Nor-
way or Switzerland shares similar patterns to those ob-
served in Germany, while countries like USA, France or
Spain feature inclinations of their epidemic surfaces re-
sembling the one observed in Italy.
The identification of the patterns shared by the out-
breaks of different countries would have otherwise been
impossible if we had to limit our view to the classical
time evolution of the epidemic compartments as in Fig. 1.
Exploring epidemic dynamics from this novel, geometric-
based perspective could unveil new “hidden” features
characterizing their evolution and foster new methods
for their statistical analysis and mathematical modeling.
We expect that our geometric framework and results will
inspire alternative approaches to the study of epidemic
evolution, possibly leading to longer-termed forecasting
techniques or to more refined epidemiometric systems for
the design of epidemic alerts and early warning systems.
7. Discussion. We have presented a geometric frame-
work to analyze and systematically classify the trajecto-
ries of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic across different coun-
tries in the (I,D) plane via three geometric parame-
ters (rmax, θ, e). Our geometric measures enables the
design of a preliminary epidemiometric system to quan-
tify the magnitude of a country’s outbreak and its inten-
sity, resembling respectively the Richter and the Mercalli
measures for seismic events, and further adding infor-
mation about the efficacy of lockdown strategies and of
patient identification. The epidemic scale measures we
defined help identifying a spectrum of SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic types, ranging from weak epidemic events with
slow speed, like those reported in Japan, Australia or
South Korea (magnitude T ' 3.4, class ++, category
A++), to very extreme events with intense damage in-
flicted on the population, like the cases of United King-
dom (magnitude T ' 5.9, class −−, category D−−) or
Italy (magnitude T ' 6.0, class −, category C−).
However, unlike other catastrophic events, the magni-
tude and intensity of an epidemic event entirely depends
on the responsiveness of the countries’ government and
the capacity of their medical systems, jointly with the
awareness of their population to their potential dam-
age. In this respect, early estimation of the epidemic
scales (e.g. by merging them with forecasting models)
could significantly contribute to the design of warning
systems [19, 20] or protocols for virus alerts to enhance
the public and governmental responsiveness. We showed
that, in cases like Italy or Spain (Fig. 7), the epidemic
angle θ has crossed the threshold θ∗ = 0.05rad from
slow to fast pandemics way before reaching the infected
and fatality peaks, reflecting a slow responsiveness to
the rapidly emerging crisis. From the mathematical per-
spective, our geometric method further raises relevant
insights to improve current epidemic models. The ge-
ometric characterization of the epidemic plumes in the
(I,D) plane, discloses an integrated and low-dimensional
approach to modeling the epidemic trends by imposing
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geometric constraints relating the data-driven parame-
ters (rmax, θ, e) to the epidemiological factors entering
the epidemic models adopted. This allows to lower the
number of independent parameters, identifying a suitable
sub-manifold of the high dimensional phase space where
plumes congruent to the data-driven ones can be found.
We have demonstrated this approach by manually search-
ing, in an SEIRD model with a time-dependent repro-
ductive number, the best choices of the epidemiological
and intervention parameters satisfying the data-driven
geometric constraints for the Italian trends, obtaining a
realistic description of the reported behaviors.
We foresee that the merging of our data-driven, low-
dimensional approach with more advanced mathematical
or computational methods [27, 80], could lead to predic-
tions of the epidemiometric fingerprints of real-world epi-
demics with ever-increasing accuracy, possibly disclosing
new directions to the identification of optimal priors for
more efficient and longer-termed epidemic forecasting.
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